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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-






BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with possession of a stolen 
motor vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., in the Third Judicial District Court, without 
a jury, and found guilty as charged on January 20, 1978. 
Appellant also sought a writ of habeas corpus 
before the Honroable Peter F. Leary of the Third Judicial 
District Court, which was denied, with prejudice, on June 
22, 1978. 
On appeal, appellant seeks to have these matters 
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consolidated as the issues are claimed to be the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges that the actions of the lower 
courts in convicting and sentencing appellant and in 
denying him a writ of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 2, 1977, Stephanie Hancock parked 
her family stationwagon in the parking lot west of West 
High School in Salt Lake City. When she returned a few 
hours later, the car was missing (T.10). Both Stephanie 
and her father identified the vehicle involved in these 
proceedings as their stationwagon, the only change made 
I 
having been that the key cylinder had been removed (T.6,11). 
I 
Two days later, on November 4, 1977, a security , 
agent at Sears Department Store, John Mcintre, was 
contacted by a Mr. Bates who said that he thought the 
person he was with had stolen the car they were using 
(T.13). Mr. Mcintre called the police and then walked 
into the parking lot where he recorded the license plate 
h · · ("' 14) When he was about number oft e car in question 1. • 
40 feet from the car, he saw Mr. Bates get in the passenger I 
lk Out of thf' side and a man who looked like the appellant wa 
-7.-
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store carrying a brown "Sears" bag. The man got into the 
car and drove away. Mr. Mcintre noted that while he 
could not identify the appellant positively as that man, 
there was a definite resemblance (T.15). 
Mr. Bates contacted Brent Ellcock, a Salt 
Lake City Police Officer, later that evening in the 
Salt Lake City Police Station (T.18). Officer Ellcock was 
directed by Mr. Bates to the Pal-D-Mar Bowling Alley several 
blocks away (T.lB). Officer Ellcock and Mr. Bates went to 
that area together, where they found the Hancock stationwagon 
which was listed on the police "want sheet" as stolen (T.18, 
19). An officer Dowling was assigned to observe the vehicle 
while Officer Ellcock returned to the police station with Mr. 
Bates in an attempt to locate the person he had described as 
the driver of the vehicle (T.19). Upon his return, Officer 
Ellcock observed appellant talking to the desk sergeant (T.20). 
Since appellant fit the description given by Mr. Bates, Officer 
Ellcock asked the desk sergeant to contact the dispatcher and 
let him and Officer Dowling know when appellant left the 
station (T.20). 
Officer Dowling testified that he had disabled the 
stolen vehicle by disconnecting the main distributor wire 
and then waited across the street where he could observe the 
-3-
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vehicle and not be seen (T.34). Ten minutes later, 
appellant got into the driver's seat of the car. When 
Officer Dowling approached and opened the car door, 
appellant dropped a screwdriver which he had held 
pointed towards the ignition switch (T.34-35). The 
key cylinder was broken out and in Officer Dowling's 
opinion, appellant was attempting to start the car 
(T.35-36). 
Officer Ellcock arrived at about that time 
and arrested appellant after reading him his rights from 
a card and asking if he understood them. Appellant 
responded that he did understand his rights (T.22,36). 
En route to the jail, appellant kept saying that he 
did not understand why he was being arrested or that the 
car was stolen (T.25), although he also stated that 
"Bryan" had stolen the car (T.26). Upon a search of 
app~llant, Officer Ellcock found a six inch straight 
head screwdriver, a twelve inch wire with alligator 
clips on the ends, a notebook and a key ring with a 
blank Ford key (T.31). Officer Dowling searched the 
car and found a large "Sears" shopping bag which contained 
a new bolt cutter and straight slot type screwdriver which 
appellant had dropped on the floor (T.36,37). 
Appellant was convicted of possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle and sentenced to a term of zero to 
-4- d 
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five years in the Utah State Prison. Appellant challenged 
the sentence by seeking a writ of habeas corpus before 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, but it was denied on 
June 22, 1978. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-109 {1953), AS AMENDED, rs 
SEPARATE AND DISTINGUISHABLE FROM SECTION 112 OF THE SAME 
TITLE. 
The two statutes at issue in this case are Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 41-1-109 and 41-1-112 (1953), as amended. 
Section 41-1-109 provides: 
"Any person who drives a 
vehicle, not his own, without the 
consent of the owner thereof and 
with intent temporarily to deprive 
said owner of his possession of such 
vehicle, without intent to steal the 
same is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The consent of the owner of a vehicle 
to its taking or driving shall not in 
any case be presumed or implied b~cause 
of such owner's consent on a previous 
occasion to the taking or driving of 
such vehicle by the same or a different 
person. Any person who assists in, or 
is a party or accessory to or a~ 
accomplice in any such unauthorized 
taking or driving is guilty of a 
misdemeanor." 
Section 112, on the other hand, provides: 
"Any person who, with intent to 
procure or pass title to a vehicle 
which he knows or has reason to believe 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, receives, or transfers 
possession of the same from or 
to another, or who has in his 
possession any vehicle which 
he knows or has reason to believe 
has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, and who is not an officer 
of the law engaged at the time in 
the performance of his duty as such 
officer, is guilty of a felony." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has declared that 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953), as amended, herein 
', 
referred to as the"joyriding statute" is a lesser included! 
) 
offense of theft of a motor vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (Supp. 1977); all other statutory references will 
be to Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended). The Court noted, 1, 
State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977): 
"Both the theft and joy riding 
statutes require, as elements of the 
crime, an unauthorized control over 
the property of another with an 
intent to deprive him of his 
property. The only fact the state 
is not required to establish for 
joy riding, which is required for 
theft, is the intent to deprive 
permanently, or for such an 
extended period of time that a 
substantial portion of the 
economic value is lost." Id. at 
361. 
. I 
In fact, the joy riding statute specifically describes one I 
who has "intent temporarily to deprive said owner of his 
possession of such vehicle, without intent to ~the 
same. • • • 11 (Emphasis added.) 
~~~--------.......-6---------1111111 
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On the other hand, Section 41-1-112, clearly deals 
with automobiles which have been stolen, i.e., vehicles 
taken in violation of Section 76-6-404 and then possessed or 
transferred. Admittedly, "unlawfully taken," if construed 
in its broadest sense, could include a vehicle taken temporarily 
without the owner's permission. However, to so interpret this 
statute would violate the clear intent of the legislature. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Huddleston v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 814, 94 s.ct. 1262 (1974), noted that 
"although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they 
ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the 
obvious intention of the legislature." Id. at 1272. Utah's 
highest court has additionally declared: 
"Allowance should be made for the 
fact that statutes are necessarily 
stated in general terms, and that often 
there is neither the prescience to 
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of 
language to cover with exactitude, all 
of the exigencies of life which may 
arise. For this reason one of the 
fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute 
should be looked at as a whole and 
in the light of the general purpose it 
was intended to serve; and should be 
so interpreted and applied as to 
accomplish that objectiv~. In orde: 
to give the statute the 1mplementat1on 
which will fulfill its purpose, reason 
and intention sometimes prevail over 
technically applied literalness." 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 
972 at 974 (1965). 
-7-
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The two sections in question, Sections 41-1-109 
and 41-1-112, were enacted together as part of the Motor 
Vehicle Act in 1935. If the literal interpretation of 
Section 112 urged by appellant is adopted and we ass~e 
that the acts described in the joy riding statute and 
the latter half of Section 112 are the same, we rnust also 
assume that the legislature intended to enact contradictory 
portions of the same act. A more rational approach is that 
the legislature did not intend to contradict itself, b~ 
rather, intended to proscribe a temporary taking via the 
joy riding statute and possession or transfer of a vehicle 
feloniously taken from the owner via Section 112. 
This conclusion is strengthened when considered 
in light of the ejusdem generis rule as stated by this 
Court in Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839, 
840 (1962): 
"Another closely related rule 
which is universally accepted as 
valid is that of ejusdem generis, 
meaning 'of the same kind,' which 
rule is that: when general words 
or terms follow specific ones, the . 
general must be understood as applying 
to things of the same kind as the 
specific." 
The first half of Section 112 clearly deals 
with vehicles taken with an intent to permanently deprive 
ld not t 
since title to a vehicle taken only temporarily cou ' 
-8-
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procurred or passed. That portion makes it illegal to 
receive or transfer possession of a vehicle stolen or 
unlawfully taken. The latter portion, questioned 
here, talks about possession of a vehicle. The same 
language used in the former portion, "stolen or unlawfully 
taken," is also used in the latter. In fact, "unlawfully 
taken," as defined by appellant, would include "stolen." 
The use of both terms by the legislature indicates a clear 
intent to deal with a different category of vehicles from 
those described in the joy riding statute. 
It is respondent's contention that the two 
statutes in question, Sections 41-1-109 and 41-1-112, are 
distinguishable in that the joy riding statute proscribes 
a temporary taking of a vehicle short of stealing while 
Section 41-1-112 proscribes the handling or posssession of 
a permanently taken stolen vehicle. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL JUSTIFIED THE 
FINDER OF FACT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE APPELLANT KNEW OR 
HAD REASON TO KNOW THAT THE CAR IN HIS POSSESSION HAD 
BEEN STOLEN. 
It is clear, in Utah, that unless evidence in 
support of a court's finding is so inconclusive or 
-9-
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improbable that no reasonable mind could believe the 
defendant guilty, the verdict of the lower court will 
be upheld. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
The Court also stated in State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 
(Utah 1977): 
"In regard to the matter of 
the sufficiency of the evidence, 
this court follows long established 
precedent and will not upset a 
conviction unless there is a clear 
showing that the evidence does not 
support the verdict." Id. at 341. 
The evidence presented in the court below 
indicates that the appellant knew or had reason to 
believe the car in his possession was stolen. After 
having been given the "Miranda warning" and acknowledging 
an understanding of his rights, the appellant accused his 
passenger, Bryan Bates, of having stolen the vehicle (T.26) 
Although the key cylinder had been removed, appellant 
drove the car (T.15), and was positively identified 
while attempting to start the vehicle with a screwdriver 
(T.25). 
These facts plus the additional testimony 
contained in the transcript form an adequate basis for 
the judge's finding that appellant was guilty of a feW~ 
in having possession of a vehicle which he knew or had 
reason to know had been stolen. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-109 and 41-1-112 (1953), 
as amended, do not proscribe the same activity as claimed 
by appellant. They are distinguishable in that Section 
41-1-112 prohibits the receipt, transfer, or possession 
of a vehicle stolen from the owner with an intent to 
permanently deprive the owner thereof and Section 41-1-109, 
the joy riding statute, seeks to punish those who temporarily 
take a vehicle without the owner's permission and without 
any intent to steal. Appropriately, Section 41-1-112 carries 
a greater penalty than does Section 41-1-109. 
The evidence in this case clearly supports the 
court's finding tha~ the appellant was in possession of 
a vehicle which he knew or had reason to believe had been 
stolen. Respondent therefore urges this Court to uphold the 
conviction and sentence of the trial court and the denial of 
the writ of habeas corpus by the Honorable Peter F. Leary. 
-11-
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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